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Abstract
Electrophysiological studies have utilized event-related brain potentials to study neural processes related to the evaluation of
environmental feedback. In particular, the feedback-related negativity (FRN) has been shown to reflect the evaluation of monetary losses
and negative performance feedback. Two experiments were conducted to examine whether or not the FRN is sensitive to the magnitude of
negative feedback. In both experiments, participants performed simple gambling tasks in which they could receive a range of potential
outcomes on each trial. Relative to feedback indicating monetary gain, feedback indicating non-rewards was associated with a FRN in both
experiments; however, the magnitude of the FRN did not demonstrate sensitivity to the magnitude of non-reward in either experiment. These
data suggest that the FRN reflects the early appraisal of feedback based on a binary classification of good versus bad outcomes. These data are
discussed in terms of contemporary theories of the FRN, as well as appraisal processes implicated in emotional processing.
# 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Biological Psychology 71 (2006) 148–1541. Introduction
Humans often require feedback from the environment to
determine the success of their actions. In such tasks,
feedback must be evaluated to determine both its valence –
whether the feedback indicates a good or bad outcome – and
its magnitude—the degree of goodness or badness
associated with the outcome. Recent studies have utilized
event-related potentials (ERPs) to examine how this
evaluative process is implemented in the brain. In particular,
studies have identified a negative deflection at fronto-central
recording sites that peaks approximately 250 ms following
feedback presentation and appears larger following the
presentation of negative feedback (Gehring andWilloughby,
2002; Hajcak et al., 2005; Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Holroyd
et al., 2004a; Miltner et al., 1997; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004b;
Yeung et al., 2005; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; for reviews, see
Holroyd et al., 2004b; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004a). Evidence* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 302 831 1041; fax: +1 302 831 3645.
E-mail address: hajcak@psych.udel.edu (G. Hajcak).
0301-0511/$ – see front matter # 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2005.04.001from source-localization suggests that the feedback-related
negativity (FRN) is generated in areas of the medial
prefrontal cortex, such as the anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd and Coles,
2002; Luu et al., 2003).
Miltner et al. (1997) reported that this FRN was elicited
when subjects received feedback indicating inaccurate
performance in a time estimation task (cf. Luu et al.,
2003; Ruchsow et al., 2002). Holroyd and Coles (2002)
subsequently argued that the FRN reflects the activity of a
reinforcement learning system, and is used to adjust
subsequent behavior. This reinforcement learning theory
(RL-theory) is based on research that implicates the basal
ganglia and the midbrain dopamine system in reward
prediction and reinforcement learning (Barto, 1995;
Montague et al., 1996; for review, see Schultz, 2002), and
argues that a FRN is generated when outcomes are first
evaluated as worse than expected. More specifically, the
FRN is thought to reflect the impact of phasic decreases in
dopamine signals from the basal ganglia on motor-related
areas of the ACC.
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the evaluation of events along a general good–bad
dimension (Holroyd et al., 2002). This is consistent with
the fact that a FRN has been observed following feedback
indicating inaccurate performance and monetary loss
(Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Hajcak et al., 2005; Luu
et al., 2003; Miltner et al., 1997; Yeung et al., 2005; Yeung
and Sanfey, 2004). In fact, a recent study found that the FRN
reflected either utilitarian (monetary loss) or performance
(incorrect choice) information (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004b).
When feedback conveyed both of these dimensions
simultaneously, the feedback dimension that was more
perceptually salient determined whether a FRN was
observed.
It is important to note that the RL-theory does not specify
what sort of events are construed by the evaluative system as
being negative—only that the FRN is elicited by unexpected
negative outcomes. In fact, Holroyd et al., 2004a found that
the type of outcome that elicited a FRN differed depending
on the task context. For example, feedback indicating that
subjects received no reward generated a FRN when the
alternative outcomes were rewards. However, the same
feedback did not generate a FRN when the alternative
outcomes were monetary losses. Thus, consistent with the
RL-theory, the FRN was elicited by unexpected unfavorable
outcomes; however, what constituted an unfavorable out-
come was determined by the alternative feedback associated
with the given task context.
The focus of the present study is on how the system that
generates the FRN evaluates outcomes with intermediate
values when a range of outcomes is possible. One possibility
is that FRN amplitude is monotonically related to feedback
value, such that the highest value outcome would be
associated with the smallest FRN, and increasingly bad
outcomes would be associated with increasingly large FRNs
(Holroyd et al., 2004a). Alternatively, the FRN might reflect
the binary categorization of good versus bad outcomes, such
that an event is categorized as either good or bad, but not
between (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004).
Yeung and Sanfey (2004) addressed this issue by utilizing
a task in which subjects could gamble a small or large
amount of money on each trial. Although monetary losses
were associated with a larger FRN than monetary gains, the
magnitude of the FRN was insensitive to whether the losses
were small or large. Insofar as bad outcomes, but not good
outcomes, elicited equally large FRNs, these data seem to
indicate that the FRN is related to the simple bad versus
good appraisal of feedback.
However, Nieuwenhuis et al. (2004a) have pointed out that
subjects in Yeung and Sanfey’s (2004) study knew, on each
trial, whether the outcome would either be small or large in
magnitude.Therefore, it ispossible that themonitoring system
might scale its response to negative feedback based on the
potential gain on each trial. In this case, losingUS$ 5.00when
one could have won US$ 5.00 may be just as bad as losing
US$ 10.00 when one could have won US$ 10.00. Thus, it isunclear at present whether the magnitude of the FRN on a
given trial is sensitive to intermediate values of negative
feedback, or whether it simply conveys the dichotomous
evaluation of bad versus good outcomes.
In the present study, we sought to systematically evaluate
the sensitivity of the FRN to the value of feedback in two
simple gambling experiments. To avoid the issue raised by
Nieuwenhuis et al. (2004a), we used a paradigm in which
subjects did not know prior to feedback whether the
magnitude of the feedback would be small or large. In each
experiment, we sought to compare the magnitude of the FRN
elicited by intermediate and extreme outcomes to determine
whether the system that generates the FRN is sensitive to the
graded value of feedback or whether it simply categorizes
feedback in a binary fashion, as good versus bad.2. Experiment 1
In this experiment, subjects performed a gambling task in
which four outcomes that varied in magnitude and valence
were equally likely as feedback. On each trial, participants
couldgain25¢, gain5¢, lose5¢,or lose25¢. Insofar as subjects
could gain or lose a smaller or larger amount of money on
each trial, this experimental paradigm was similar to that
used by Yeung and Sanfey (2004). However, in the current
experiment, subjects were not aware of trial magnitude prior
to receiving feedback. In this way, we sought to determine
whether the FRN demonstrates graded sensitivity to the value
of negative feedback. If the magnitude of the FRN is
monotonically related to the value of feedback, then larger
losses should elicit an enhanced FRN relative to smaller
losses, and small gains should elicit a larger FRN compared to
large gains (i.e., the magnitude of the feedback should
moderate the relationship betweenvalence and themagnitude
oftheFRNwhichshouldbereflectedinamagnitudebyvalence
interaction;Holroydetal.,2004). If,ontheotherhand, theFRN
reflectsonly thegoodversusbaddichotomizationas suggested
byYeungandSanfey (2004), then theFRNshouldbe larger for
monetary lossesandshouldnotbesensitive to themagnitudeof
the feedback.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Subjects
Sixteen undergraduate students (10 females) were
recruited through the University of Delaware Psychology
Department subject pool to participate in the current study.
All participants received course credit for their participation.
In addition, subjects were told that they could earn between
US$ 0.00 and US$ 10.00 in bonus money based on their
performance.
2.1.2. Task
The task was administered on a Pentium I class computer,
using Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems Inc.)
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Throughout the task, subjects were shown a graphic
representing four doors in a horizontal line, and were
instructed to choose a door. Subjects were instructed to press
the left and right ‘ctrl’ and ‘alt’ keys to select a door.
Following each choice, subjects received feedback indicat-
ing that they either won 25¢ (‘+ +’), won 5¢ (‘+’), lost 5¢
(‘’), or lost 25¢ (‘ ’). To increase the perceptual
difference between the feedback stimuli, the two ‘+’ stimuli
were presented on top of one another (e.g., one above the
center of the screen, and one just below the center of the
screen) whereas the two ‘’ stimuli were presented next to
one another (e.g., one to the left of the center of the screen,
and one just to the right of the center of the screen). In this
way, subjects could win or lose either a smaller or larger
amount of money on each trial. All stimuli were presented
against a black background and were positioned in the center
of the screen. All feedback stimuli occupied approximately
28 of visual angle horizontally, and 28 vertically, and were
presented in green font. A white fixation mark (+) was
presented just prior to the onset of each stimulus.
In terms of stimulus timing, the doors remained on the
screen until subjects responded; the feedback appeared
500 ms following response, and remained on the screen for
1000 ms. The interval between offset of the feedback
stimulus and the onset of the following set of doors was
1000 ms.
Subjects were informed that they would begin the
experiment with US$ 5.00 in bonus money, and could earn
and lose money based on their performance. Unbeknownst
to the subjects, the outcome of each trial was predetermined
and pseudo-random such that each feedback was delivered
on exactly 25% of trials. Thus, all subjects were
compensated US$ 5.00 for their participation.
2.1.3. Procedure
After a brief description of the experiment, EEG sensors
were attached and the subject was given detailed task
instructions. To become familiar with the task, subjects were
given a practice block consisting of 40 trials, in which no
money could be gained or lost. Following the practice,
subjects were told that they would begin the experiment with
US$ 5.00 and could gain or lose money based on their
performance during the experiment. The actual experiment
consisted of four blocks of 40 trials (160 total trials) with
each block initiated by the subject. Each feedback was
presented exactly 40 times over the course of the
experiment. Upon completion of the task, participants were
asked to rate the valence of their reactions to each of the four
trial outcomes.
2.1.4. Psychophysiological recording, data reduction,
and analysis
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from tin
electrodes using a Neurosoft Quik-Cap. Recordings were
taken from four locations along the midline: frontal (Fz),fronto-central (FCz), central (Cz), and parietal (Pz). In
addition, Med-Associates tin electrodes were placed on the
left and right mastoids (Ml andM2, respectively). During the
recording, all activity was referenced to Cz. The electro-
oculogram (EOG) generated from blinks and vertical eye-
movements was also recorded using Med-Associates
miniature electrodes placed approximately 1 cm above
and below the subject’s right eye. The right earlobe served as
a ground site. All EEG/EOG electrode impedances were
below 10 kV and the data from all channels were recorded
by a Grass Model 7D polygraph with Grass Model 7P1F
preamplifiers (bandpass = 0.05–35 Hz).
All bioelectric signals were digitized on a laboratory
microcomputer using VPM software (Cook, 1999). The
EEG was sampled at 200 Hz. Data collection began with the
subjects’ response (500 ms prior to feedback), and continued
for 1500 ms. Off-line, the EEG for each trial was corrected
for vertical EOG artifacts using the method developed by
Gratton et al. (1983) and Miller et al. (1988) and then re-
referenced to the average activity of the mastoid electrodes.
Trials were rejected and not counted in subsequent analysis
if there was excessive physiological artifact (i.e., 25 ms of
invariant analog data on any channel or A/D values on any
channel that equaled that converter’s minimum or maximum
values). Single trial EEG data were lowpass filtered at 20 Hz
with a 51-weight FIR digital filter as per Cook and Miller
(1992). Finally, stimulus-locked ERPs were averaged
separately for each type of feedback stimulus.
Because area measures of the FRN confound variation in
the FRN with differences in other ERP components, such as
the P300, the FRN was measured base-to-peak (cf. Holroyd
et al., 2003). Each data point after feedback onset was
subtracted from a baseline equal to the average activity in a
200 ms window prior to the feedback. The FRN was then
defined as the difference between the maximum value
between 150 ms and 350 ms following feedback onset and
the most negative point between this maximum and 350 ms
following feedback onset. If there was no negative deflection
(e.g., if the two data points were the same), the FRN was
scored as zero.
The FRN was statistically evaluated using SPSS (Version
11.5) General Linear Model software with the Greenhouse–
Geisser correction applied to p-values associated with
multiple df repeated measures comparisons.
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Behavioral results
The feedback was presented in a pseudo-random order
such that performance had no relationship to feedback.
However, subjects were asked to complete a post-task
questionnaire in which they rated how they felt when they
saw each stimulus on a scale from 1 (very unhappy) to 7
(very happy). On average, subjects rated their feelings on
small and large gains as 5.0 (S.D. = .76) and 6.00
(S.D. = 1.06), respectively; the average rating for small
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A 2 (valence)  2 (magnitude) repeated measures ANOVA
confirmed that subjects reported feeling happier following
gains than losses (F(l, 15) = 52.28, p < .001). Consistent
with the notion that larger magnitude outcomes were better
for gains but worse for losses, subjects did not differ overall
in how happy they felt following larger versus smaller
magnitude outcomes (F(1, 15) < 1); however, there was a
significant valence  magnitude interaction (F(l, 14) =
16.01, p < .001). Post hoc comparisons indicated that
subjects reported being happier both for large compared to
small gains (t(14) = 5.12, p < .001), and for small compared
to large losses (t(14) = 5.17, p < .001).
2.2.2. ERP results
The FRN was quantified at Fz, where it was maximal
(similar results were found when it was evaluated at other
midline recording sites, and when all sites were included in
the analyses). Fig. 1 presents ERP averages (top) and FRN
magnitudes (bottom) for each type of feedback at Fz. A 2
(valence)  2 (magnitude) repeated measures ANOVA
confirmed the impression from Fig. 1 that the FRN was
larger for feedback indicating loss compared to feedback
indicating gain (F(1, 15) = 10.73, p < .01); however, the
effect of magnitude (F(1, 15) < 1) and the interaction of
valence and magnitude (F(1, 15) = 1.78, p > .20) did not
reach significance. Thus, larger FRNs were elicited by
feedback indicating monetary losses; however, the FRN didFig. 1. Feedback-locked ERPs from Experiment 1 at Fz (top) and FRN
magnitudes at Fz (bottom).not demonstrate sensitivity to the magnitude of the
outcomes.
2.3. Discussion
In the present experiment, a frontally maximal negative
deflection (the FRN) was observed following feedback
indicating monetary loss. These data are consistent with
previous studies that report a similar negative deflection
following monetary losses in comparable experimental
paradigms (Hajcak et al., 2005; Holroyd et al., 2004a;
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004a; Yeung et al., 2005; Yeung and
Sanfey, 2004). Importantly, the magnitude of the FRN
appeared insensitive to the magnitude dimension of the
feedback.
Because, only losses appeared to elicit a sizable FRN, and
the FRN did not vary as a function of feedback magnitude,
the present results suggest that the FRN reflects the binary
classification of bad versus good outcomes. These results are
consistent with data reported by Yeung and Sanfey (2004),
who found a similar-sized FRN following small and large
value negative feedback following small and large value
trials. Because each feedback was equally as likely on each
trial, the present data extend the results reported by Yeung
and Sanfey by ruling out the possibility that the magnitude of
the FRN could be scaled based on the known trial value (cf.
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004a). Although the magnitude of the
FRN did not appear sensitive to feedback value, behavioral
ratings of the feedback following the experiment indicated
sensitivity to the magnitude of the outcomes. In this way,
results from the current experiment suggest a dissociation
between behavior and the FRN.
Although these data suggest that the magnitude of the
FRN reflects the binary evaluation of good versus bad
outcomes, an alternative possibility is that the relationship
between feedback value and FRN magnitude is monotonic,
but non-linear. For instance, feedback value and FRN
amplitude might be related following a sigmoid-like
function that changes slowly from 25 to 5, rapidly from
5 to +5, and slowly again from +5 to +25 (see Fig. 2). Our
statistical test (i.e., the interaction of valence and magnitude)
may not have been sensitive to such a non-linear function. If
the relationship between feedback value and FRN magni-
tude does, in fact, follow such a non-linear sigmoidal
relationship, then feedback intermediate to gains and losses
should elicit a FRN with an intermediate magnitude.
However, if the FRN reflects a more coarse binary evaluation
of good versus bad outcomes, outcomes intermediate to
gains and losses should elicit FRNs that resemble either
gains or losses (depending on whether this outcome is
classified as good or bad by the system that generates the
FRN). To address this issue, and to replicate the present
experiment’s results regarding the role of feedback value on
the FRN, we conducted a second gambling experiment in
which ‘0’ (e.g., breaking even) was added as a potential
outcome.
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Fig. 2. Plot of feedback value and FRNmagnitude from Experiment 1 and a
possible non-linear monotonic function (sigmoid) that may describe the
relationship between feedback value and FRN magnitude.
Fig. 3. Feedback-locked ERPs from Experiment 2 at Fz (top) and FRN
magnitudes at Fz (bottom).3. Experiment 2
In this second experiment, we sought to further explore
whether the magnitude of the FRN reflects the binary
evaluation of good versus bad outcomes, or if its magnitude
increases with the value of negative feedback in a graded
fashion. Specifically, the results from Experiment 1 could
not rule out the possibility that the relationship between FRN
magnitude and feedback value follows a non-linear,
sigmoid-like function. To test this possibility, subjects in
Experiment 2 performed a simple gambling experiment in
which they chose between one of five doors on each trial,
and received feedback indicating whether they gained 25¢,
gained 5¢, broke even, lost 5¢, or lost 25¢. In this way,
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, except ‘0’ was
a possible outcome and there were five potential outcomes
on a given trial. If the relationship between FRN magnitude
and feedback value is best described by a sigmoidal
function, then the FRN magnitude observed following ‘0’
feedback trials should be intermediate to that observed
following small gains and small losses. However, if the FRN
reflects a binary categorization of good versus bad
outcomes, then both small and large losses should elicit
an equally large ERN, whereas both small and large gains
should elicit similarly small FRNs; importantly, if the
relationship between feedback value and FRN is binary, then
the FRN elicited by breaking even should elicit a FRN equal
in magnitude to either gains or losses, but should not be
intermediate to gains and losses.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Subjects
Seventeen undergraduate students (12 females) at the
University of Delaware participated in the current experi-ment for extra credit in an upper level psychology course. In
addition, subjects were told that they could earn between
US$ 0.00 and US$ 10.00 in bonus money based on their
performance.
3.1.2. Task and procedure
Subjects performed a gambling experiment similar to the
one in Experiment 1, except they were told that on each trial
they could either gain or lose either a small (5¢) or large
(25¢) amount of money, or break even. Thus, Experiment 2
was identical to Experiment 1 except that there were five
doors to choose from on each trial, breaking even (‘0’
feedback) was a potential outcome, each feedback was
presented on exactly 20% of the trials, and there were six
blocks of 40 trials (240 total). No self-report data was
collected after Experiment 2. All other procedures and
analyses in Experiment 2 were identical to Experiment 1.
3.2. Results
Fig. 3 (top) presents ERP averages and Fig. 3 (bottom)
presents the average FRN amplitudes for each type of
feedback at Fz, where the FRN was maximal. As in
Experiment 1, the FRN peaked approximately 300 ms after
feedback indicating small and large monetary losses. In
addition, a large FRN was also evident on trials in which
subjects broke even. A one-way ANOVAwith five levels of
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The results of this test confirmed the impression from Fig. 2
that the FRN differed with the type of feedback (F(4,
64) = 7.09, p < .001). Consistent with the ERP waveforms
in Fig. 3 (top) and FRN magnitudes in Fig. 3 (bottom), post
hoc t-tests with Bonferonni correction applied to the p-
values (.05/5 = .01) indicated that large losses did not differ
from either small losses (t(16) = 1.194, p > .80) or breaking
even (t(16) = 1.162, p > .25); in addition, small losses did
not differ from breaking even (t(16) = 1.229, p > .20), and
large gains did not differ from small gains (t(16) = 1.383,
p > .15); however, feedback indicating reward (‘+’ and
‘+ +’) was associated with a smaller FRN than feedback
indicating non-reward (‘ ’,‘’, and ‘0’; t(16) = 3.734,
p < .01). In sum, a similar-sized FRN was observed
following all feedback that indicated the absence of
monetary reward.
3.3. Discussion
Experiment 2 was conducted, in part, to rule out the
possibility that the relationship between feedback value and
the magnitude of the FRN could be described by a non-linear
sigmoidal monotonic function (e.g., the relationship illu-
strated in Fig. 2). Contrary to this possibility, feedback
indicating that participants broke even did not elicit a FRN
with a magnitude intermediate to small gains and small
losses; in fact, the FRN observed following ‘0’ feedback was
numerically larger than the FRNs observed following small
and large losses, although this difference was not significant.
Hence, breaking even was associated with a FRN that was at
least equal in magnitude to that observed following feedback
that indicated small and large monetary losses. In addition,
large and small losses both elicited equally large FRNs.
Thus, the FRN appeared to be insensitive to the degree of
feedback value: equally large FRNs were observed
following all feedback that indicated non-reward, and much
smaller (but equally large) FRNs were observed following
feedback that indicated reward. These data are consistent
with the results of Experiment 1, and suggest that the
evaluative system that produces the FRN classifies outcomes
in a binary fashion.4. General discussion
The RL-theory holds that the FRN is elicited by
unexpected unfavorable outcomes; however, the theory
does not specify how the evaluative system determines
whether a particular outcome is favorable or unfavorable
(Holroyd and Coles, 2002). It has been suggested that the
evaluative system may determine the favorableness of
events, on the one hand, according to a monotonically
increasing function, such that outcomes with intermediate
values produces FRNs of intermediate amplitude (Holroyd
et al., 2004a), or on the other hand, according to a binaryfunction, such that FRNs of intermediate amplitude are not
possible (cf. Yeung and Sanfey, 2004).
To investigate this issue, we conducted two experiments
in which subjects could receive feedback that ranged in
value. In Experiment 1, feedback indicating that subjects
had gained 25¢ or 5¢, or lost 5¢ or 25¢ was delivered as
subjects performed a simple gambling experiment. In
Experiment 2, a similar paradigm was used; however,
subjects could also break even (e.g., gain and lose nothing).
Thus, in both experiments, the range of feedback values was
identical, and in both experiments, feedback types were
presented with equal frequency.
In both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, losses elicited
equally large FRNs independently of the magnitude of the
loss, whereas gains elicited reliably smaller FRNs.
Furthermore, in Experiment 2, feedback indicating that
nothing was lost nor gained elicited a FRN with amplitude
comparable to that elicited by small and large losses. This
result suggests that the evaluative system classified breaking
even as similar to losses when this was a potential outcome.
In this way, the examination of ERP data can shed light on
how the system that generates the FRN classifies outcomes.
Importantly, in both experiments, the FRN was similar in
size following non-reward outcomes, indicating that the
amplitude of the FRN is not related to graded values of
feedback; rather, these data provide support for the idea that
the FRN reflects the dichotomatization of good versus bad
outcomes.
It is important to note that the system that generates the
FRN appears to respond rapidly to a rather superficial
evaluation of feedback stimuli (cf. Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2004a). Thus, one might wonder whether the perceptual
similarities between large and small outcomes (i.e., ‘’
versus ‘ ’) in the current study could have masked effects
of magnitude on the FRN. This explanation seems unlikely,
however, in light of the fact that ‘’,‘ ’, and ‘0’ feedback
all elicited similar-sized FRNs in Experiment 2. Never-
theless, future studies might include more distinct feedback
stimuli to represent small versus large outcomes.
It is interesting to consider the utility of a system that
makes a coarse distinction between favorable versus
unfavorable outcomes. At some level, magnitude informa-
tion must be integrated with information about valence—
after all, larger gains and smaller losses are objectively more
valuable and desired (cf. Yeung and Sanfey, 2004). In fact,
participants in Experiment 1 reported feeling happier
following larger than smaller gains and happier following
smaller than larger losses. However, the most important
classification appears to be the simple distinction that
involves separating the good from the bad—a dichotomy
that bears a striking resemblance to distinctions drawn in
many contemporary theories of emotion and motivation. For
instance, Gray’s theory relies on the distinction between the
behavioral activation and inhibition systems (Gray, 1994;
Gray and McNaughton, 2003), and along similar lines, Lang
et al. (2000) describe emotion’s motivational organization in
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notion that prefrontal asymmetries may relate to individual
differences in emotionality relies on the distinction between
approach- and withdrawal-related affect (cf. Davidson,
2003; Davidson, 2002). Each of these theories describes
motivated action based on a general distinction between
good and bad stimuli. Accordingly, each theory assumes that
stimuli are evaluated along the valence dimension—and the
FRN may reflect this initial appraisal of a negative event.
The relationship between the FRN, prefrontal asymmetries
and other physiological systems that mark the bipolar
motivational systems is likely to be an interesting future
research topic.
In terms of the neural generator of the FRN, ERP studies
consistently suggest a single source in the medial frontal
cortex—most likely in the ACC (Gehring and Willoughby,
2002; Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Luu et al., 2003, but see
Nieuwenhuis et al., in press). In this way, the present data
further highlight the role of the ACC in the evaluation of
motivationally significant stimuli that convey information
about rewards and losses. Specifically, our findings support
the notion that the FRN reflects early ACC activity
associated with the rather coarse differentiation of favorable
versus unfavorable outcomes (cf. Yeung and Sanfey, 2004).Acknowledgements
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